TheSequitur.com Editorial Board
Jan. 7, 2007

Editor’s Note: Read dissenting opinion.

No solution is a pretty one when it comes to Iraq, but it’s about time we made some tough choices regarding America’s future there. Even President Bush is famously searching for a new direction in Iraq strategy. We decided to help him look.  

Many possibilities have been bandied about: More troops, less troops, strategic redeployment, engaging Iran and Syria, withdrawal timelines and even dividing the country. TheSequitur.com supports a more comprehensive and bold strategy, one that could give the president one last chance to be a statesman and might actually encourage a regional solution to the issues plaguing the Middle East.

Any so-called “surge” in American forces deployed to Iraq would be a grave misstep.American soldiers must stay in Iraq – for now – and, unfortunately, without a substantial increase in our troop levels there. In the meantime, the United States must mount a full-court press on both diplomatic and reconstruction fronts – an Iraqi Marshall Plan, if you will – while enticing the Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds to strive toward the grand idea of a higher national purpose. Whether that sincere effort succeeds or fails, we afterward can withdraw in good conscience without dishonor or defeat.

Calls for the troops to be immediately removed or to defund the war must go unheeded. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell and columnist Tom Friedman had the right idea in their If-you-break-it-you-buy-it “Pottery Barn Policy.” For better or worse, coalition forces overthrew the government of Iraq and occupied the country. We are obligated to put in our best efforts not to leave Iraq worse off than we found it.

But we must make these efforts without giving the impression the United States intends to maintain a permanent presence in Iraq. Any so-called “surge” in American forces deployed to Iraq would therefore be a grave misstep. While U.S. soldiers on the ground, in recent meetings with Defense Secretary Robert Gates, have insisted more troops are needed to secure the country, we are uncomfortable with the idea. Any increases in troops should be minimal and carefully calculated to avoid igniting more fears of a permanent U.S. occupation. For instance, sending troops to train Iraqi law enforcement and military personnel is preferable to sending more combat troops.      

Meanwhile, the United States should provide aggressive incentives to the Iraqi national government for achievements along the way toward a national reconciliation, effective governance and peace - an Iraqi Marshall Plan with conditions and consequences. Bearing in mind the wealth under Iraqi soils, the costs of these incentives to U.S. taxpayers need not be astronomical. These merits-based incentives, i.e. education funds, infrastructure investment, technology training, trade agreements, etc., should be tied to Iraqi progress toward becoming what Bush had intended: a stable beacon of freedom and democracy in the turbulent Middle East.

In reality, these incentives – while distributed through the national government and the usual international and non-governmental organizations – will, in some cases, have to be aimed toward one particular sectarian group or another. This will undoubtedly be a difficult task. The Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, all currently grappling for power, have different agendas, backgrounds and perceived needs.

Since the ouster of Sunni dictator Saddam Hussein and the subsequent rise of the Shiite-led government in Iraq, the Sunni minority has failed for one reason or another to effectively participate in that government and instead has rained insurgent violence on the Shiites. The Shiite majority has, in turn, participated in many ruthless killings and is accused of attempting to impose an Islamic theocracy upon Iraq. Meanwhile, the United States is left babysitting a religiously fueled civil war and propping up a flawed government that many Iraqis refuse to recognize. We support incentives that address the sensitive issues behind this bloody sectarian conflict and promote national unity.  

Of course, diplomacy alone will not mend the wounds of a centuries-old religious conflict, nor will simply throwing money at the problem. But we believe that by pinpointing both areas of commonality and areas of unique sectarian interest, creative policy-makers can fashion a package of carrots and sticks which would help strengthen Iraq while encouraging Iraqis they are better off together than apart.

It is of paramount regional importance to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq. A unified Iraq, impervious to negative Iranian and Syrian influences, is essential to Middle East stability. Iran and Syria have shown they will not contribute to either greater regional stability or a strong, unified Iraq. But before national unity can be achieved, Iraqis must feel comfortable enough in their own neighborhoods to be able to say to law enforcement, “There are three insurgents living in the house across the street.” Right now, not only is there a conspicuous absence of the rule of law in Iraq, there also is no assurance that individuals clothed in police garb are, in fact, Iraqi police officers. Moreover, bona fide officers’ loyalty to the central government often is questionable considering the strong sectarian allegiances present in the ranks.

It is of paramount regional importance to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq.The remedy is an intense initial investment in the Iraqi military, security and police forces. The goal is to make such service to Iraq an honor, effective in preserving the peace and, importantly, beneficial to the individuals serving and their families. Pensions, scholarships, benefits and salaries must all be equal to the high demands placed upon those who defend Iraqis from aggression and lawlessness. Along with an obvious increase in funding for the training and equipping of these forces, these investments would encourage internal stability, engender faith in the national government and serve as a bulwark against unwanted foreign influences.

But, for now, American and coalition forces are that bulwark. We assumed that role as the occupiers of a sovereign state. It is our duty stay until our best efforts of “leaving nothing but footprints” have been exhausted. Once they have, however, is also when our occupation of Iraq should come to an end, an incentive in itself.

Hopefully warnings of the dire consequences of a warring or divided Iraq combined with incentives aimed to create a real national identity will encourage the battling factions to settle down for the common good. But if not, at least we know we have sincerely tried to do something good in a troubled region of the world, bring democracy to a people long oppressed and reestablish the United States as the protector of freedom in a sometimes anarchic world.